REGULATION OF COMPETITION IN THE ECONOMY OF PLATFORMS: PROBLEMS AND TOOLS

Abstract

An important consequence of the digitalization of the economy is the radical restructuring of the institutional landscape of human economic activity. Its key element is the rapid spread of the platform business model, which is achieved through competitive advantages over traditional hierarchical structures. In the new conditions, the transformation of their sources and tools of competition actualizes the task of reviewing the principles of state competition policy.
The specifics of information (digital) platforms as an object of regulatory influence are determined, the principles of regulation in the digital economy are outlined, the role of IPs as regulatory intermediaries is indicated, the peculiarities of the state competition policy in the IP economy are highlighted. The directions of market positioning, sources of competitive advantages of digital platforms and their influence on the transformation of regulatory policy are considered. Emphasis is placed on the peculiarities of combining strict rules and general principles, diffuse monitoring and algorithmic control, the need to take into account the differences between B2B, B2C and P2P in the process of regulating the activities of platforms. The tools of their regulation are presented. The regulatory functions of digital platforms are defined and the key role of reputational tools as a means of regulation is substantiated. The preconditions and mechanisms of using digital platforms as regulatory intermediaries are analyzed. Examples of regulatory mediation are given.
The areas of competition policy include support for the development of digital platforms, protection of competition and restriction of monopolization of markets formed by platforms, protection of competition in platform ecosystems. The focus is on the role of data as a specific factor of production and a resource for gaining competitive advantage in platform markets. The tools of prohibitions and obligations that can be used to restrict anti-competitive behavior are presented. The preconditions for the emergence and means of anticompetitive actions of structural (dominant) platforms are analyzed. Mergers and acquisitions are studied as an object of regulation of anticompetitive actions in the platform economy. The influence of platforming on the prospects of national competition policy development is considered.