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REFUGEES FROM COMMUNISM: US POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICAL EMIGRATION AMID SOVIETIZATION (1944—1952)

The research purpose is to identify the specific features of the formation and implementation of US policy toward political emigration from Central and Eastern European countries from 1944 to 1952 in the context of the Sovietization of the region and the escalation of the Cold War. The focus is on analyzing the mechanisms of admission, legal status, political processing, and symbolic use of refugees from communism who fled the territories of newly established socialist regimes. The article examines both Washington's strategic approaches to the issue of political emigration and personalized cases — the flight of government officials, diplomats, military personnel, and intellectuals from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and other countries. Emphasis is placed on the interaction of the US administration with émigré committees, the activities of the International Refugee Organization, and the diplomatic conflict surrounding repatriation. **Methodology.** A set of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, comparison, dialectical) and special (historical-genetic, historical-comparative, historical-typological, problem-chronological) methods of historical cognition has been applied. The problem-chronological method serves as the primary analytical framework, enabling the study to trace the evolution of US refugee policy over a defined period and to correlate political developments in the Eastern Bloc with institutional

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and diplomatic responses in Washington. The historical-comparative method is used in a subsidiary role to highlight differences in national approaches between the United States and its allies. **The scientific novelty** lies in a comprehensive analysis of the United States' role in resolving the problem of Eastern European political emigration as an important component of the American strategy to counter Soviet influence in Europe. For the first time in Ukrainian historiography, the political, security, and humanitarian aspects of this policy are summarized based on a wide range of archival sources. **Conclusions.** The study demonstrates that between 1944 and 1952, the United States' approach to refugees from communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe combined humanitarian assistance with strategic calculation. Initially framed within multilateral postwar relief efforts, US policy increasingly reflected the priorities of Cold War confrontation, integrating refugee protection into broader political, informational, and diplomatic objectives. The adoption of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights reinforced the legal and moral grounds for opposing forced repatriation, while selective resettlement programs prioritized individuals whose political, professional, or symbolic value could strengthen Western influence. This dual approach positioned the United States both as a defender of those fleeing totalitarianism and as an active participant in the ideological struggle shaping the postwar international order.

Keywords: *USA, political emigration, refugees from communism, displaced persons, Cold War, International Refugee Organization (IRO), Central and Eastern Europe, diplomacy.*

Despite the overall successful implementation of postwar repatriation efforts and the active resettlement work of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the refugee problem on the European continent persisted. US-Soviet tensions in the second half of the 1940s escalated into open geopolitical confrontation, culminating in the bipolar division of the continent. A natural reaction to the establishment of pro-Soviet regimes “from Szczecin to Trieste” was the sharp increase in the number of escapees from the countries behind the “Iron Curtain.” In the context of the unfolding Cold War and the sealing of Western borders by Moscow’s satellite states, the American occupation administration faced a new challenge.

Scholarly literature has examined various aspects of postwar displacement and American refugee policy, yet important lacunae remain. Foundational works by G. Loescher [1] and L. Holborn [2] have outlined the institutional framework of the IRO and international humanitarian responses, but they give limited attention to the political category of “refugees from communism.” Studies by I. Lukes [3], P. Wandycz [4], I. Deák [5], and M. Petraru [6] have addressed the emigration of political elites from countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland, but these contributions tend to be nationally segmented and do not offer a systemic view of US refugee policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Biographical accounts such as those by M. Albright [7], F. Moravec [8], and N. Georgescu-Roegen [9] shed light on individual motivations and experiences, yet remain anecdotal in nature. As a result, comprehensive research on the regional dimension of American policy toward political emigration from Central and Eastern Europe remains scarce.

In Ukrainian historiography, the works of Ye. Kaminskyi [10] offer a valuable analysis of US foreign policy toward Ukraine and the broader Central and Eastern European region during the Cold War. His research, particularly on the conceptual foundations

and practical evolution of Washington's strategy, provides important contextual insights that help situate American policy toward political emigration within the larger framework of geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This article aims to fill that gap by analyzing both the institutional and symbolic responses of the US government to the influx of political refugees from communist regimes during 1944—1952. It investigates how the United States dealt with asylum, screening, and support mechanisms, and how these refugees were integrated into broader ideological narratives and foreign policy strategies. In doing so, the study not only reconstructs the evolution of US policy but also reveals how the refugee issue became a critical instrument in the struggle for influence in postwar Europe.

Complications in addressing the influx of Central and Eastern European refugees were linked to the anticipated dissolution of the IRO and the fact that this category of persons fell outside the organization's formal mandate. Accordingly, "refugees from communism," "Iron Curtain refugees," or "Cold War refugees" were considered to be individuals originating from Soviet bloc countries who were not covered by the IRO's authority (except for German expellees) and who were compelled to flee Central and Eastern Europe or the USSR due to political, ethnic, or religious persecution.

It is important to clearly differentiate between political refugees and displaced persons (DPs) to avoid analytical conflation. Political refugees, or "escapees," were individuals who fled their country of origin primarily for political, ideological, or religious reasons – typically in direct opposition to newly established communist regimes. Displaced persons, by contrast, were civilians uprooted by wartime deportations, border changes, or forced population transfers, such as the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia or the displacement of nearly 200,000 ethnic Turks from Bulgaria between 1949 and 1952.

Western Allied authorities often exploited specific legal interpretations to prevent the forced repatriation of DPs to the Soviet Union. A notable example concerned Western Ukrainians who had been Polish citizens before September 1939; US immigration officials refused to recognize them as Soviet nationals, allowing them to claim Polish citizenship instead. This practice — which rested on a narrow reading of international agreements — effectively shielded thousands from mandatory return under the Yalta and Potsdam repatriation provisions.

Postwar repatriation policies toward Soviet citizens varied across the Allied zones but reflected generally a gradual shift from initial compliance with Soviet demands to a more selective, case-by-case approach, particularly after 1946 when reports of reprisals against returnees became widespread.

Moreover, the United States joined the international consensus on fundamental rights by supporting the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1948. This landmark document, particularly Article 14, affirmed the right of every individual to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution, aligning with the US stance on protecting political refugees. Washington's endorsement of the Declaration provided both a moral and legal framework that reinforced its postwar humanitarian policy and informed its opposition to forced repatriation during the early Cold War.

It is worth noting that the state coups in Central and Eastern European countries between 1944 and 1948, which resulted in the establishment of pro-communist regimes, represented unilateral violations by Moscow of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. These events became some of the most critical factors leading to the onset of the Cold War and the formation of a bipolar world order. In diplomatic circles, the term “postwar foreign policy mistakes of the United States” was soon openly acknowledged. US Ambassador to Hungary Arthur Schoenfeld attempted to explain the rapid Sovietization of Central and Eastern Europe as stemming from a naïve belief in the United Nations’ ability to resist “Soviet imperialism” and from a flawed assessment of the position of non-communist elements within coalition governments [11, p. 554].

Shortly after the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, political refugees began arriving illegally in the American zone of Germany. At home, they were branded with the derogatory label “defectors,” and authorities submitted extradition requests for them. In response to a protest note from the new Prague regime, General Lucius Clay declared on March 10, 1948, that while the American authorities would not permit the formation of exile government structures, they would also not return refugees to their countries of origin. Among the first to arrive in Frankfurt was the former Czechoslovak Minister of Health, Adolf Procházka, whom the new leader, Klement Gottwald, publicly denounced as an “agent of foreign reaction” [12, p. 14]. Procházka was one of the twelve ministers in Gottwald’s cabinet who, in February 1948, rashly resigned in protest. Contrary to their expectations, this move did not lead to new elections but instead opened the path to communist power consolidation. After arriving in the United States, Procházka continued his civic and political activities and became the head of the Central European Christian Democratic Union in 1950 [13, p. 334].

That same year, other former government officials also managed amid great difficulty to reach the United States. Among them were Mikuláš Franek, Minister of Unification; Štefan Kočvara, Deputy Prime Minister; Hubert Ripka, Minister of Foreign Trade; Jaroslav Stránský, Minister of Education; Petr Zenkl, Deputy Prime Minister; and Václav Majer, Minister of Food. Notably, Jaroslav Stránský crossed the Czechoslovak-German border with his son in a car belonging to the American consul.

However, not all opponents of the new regime managed to leave Czechoslovakia. In March 1948, Minister of Posts František Hála and Deputy Prime Minister Jan Šrámek were detained while attempting to leave the country and placed under house arrest. General Karel Janoušek was sentenced to 19 years in prison for attempting to flee, while former Minister of Justice Prokop Drtina received a 15-year sentence after a failed suicide attempt [8, p. 238].

In the first six months following the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, an average of 75 individuals per day fled the country to the American zone in Germany, bringing the total to approximately 12,000 people. Most of the escapees crossed through forests, although some swam across the Danube River or hijacked airplanes. Illegal entrants were housed in a military camp in Ludwigsburg. Given that the majority were young people, an “exile university” was established in the camp, involving 20 former professors and 300 students. In addition, American camps hosted Czech

war veterans who refused to return home — 250 members of the British Royal Air Force, 600 soldiers from the Czechoslovak army-in-exile, and 800 civil servants. Some of them emigrated further west, while others remained in Germany. As of October 1, 1948, there were 4,131 individuals from Czechoslovakia in American military camps in Germany, around 1,000 in the Austrian occupation zone, and approximately 2,000 in Italy [14, p. 2].

On April 16, 1948, US diplomat Robert Murphy requested clarification from the State Department regarding the growing influx of Czech nationals into the American occupation zone and their future status. By late March 1948, their numbers had reached 200 persons per day, arriving in a destitute state and being temporarily supported by local German refugee aid commissions. Murphy proposed securing financial support from the Czech émigré community in the United States and involving the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO) in resettling them in other countries¹. On July 4, 1948, Secretary of State George C. Marshall instructed the US consulate in Geneva and IRO director William H. Tuck to engage PCIRO in providing protection for bona fide² Czech refugees who had arrived after February 1, 1948, due to fear of persecution. He emphasized that this was an exceptional situation caused by the communist coup. The continued presence of these individuals in Germany, given the recent expulsion of 1,750,000 Sudeten Germans by the Czechoslovak authorities and the potential for ethnic tensions, was viewed as a security concern. However, the Department of State did not consider the involvement of voluntary relief agencies a viable solution³. On August 4, 1948, General Lucius Clay signed an agreement with William Tuck under which the IRO assumed responsibility for this category of refugees in cases of serious medical emergencies.

In addition to well-known politicians, high-ranking military officials and diplomats also left the country. On March 29, 1948, Brigadier General František Moravec fled from Czechoslovakia to Germany. Moravec, who had previously organized the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, possessed intelligence skills that were of interest to the American services. US Counterintelligence Corps Colonel Charles Katek recruited him to assist in agent training. In 1954, Moravec immigrated to the United States, where he served as a consultant to the US Department of Defense.

In 1949, Czechoslovak diplomat Josef Korbel, a former ambassador to Yugoslavia and member of the United Nations Commission on the Kashmir issue, applied for political asylum in the United States. After receiving a favorable response, he was awarded a Rockefeller Foundation grant and invited to teach international relations at the University of Denver [15, p. 349].

¹ National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), National Archives at College Park (NACP), Maryland. RG 59, S. IRO and DPC, I. DPC, B. 8, Incoming telegram from R. Murphy to DOS concerning Czech Refugees in US Zone, April 16, 1948, n/a.

² Good faith.

³ NARA NACP, Maryland. RG 59, S. IRO and DPC, I. DPC, B. 8, Outgoing telegram from the Secretary of State G. Marshall to US Consulate in Geneva concerning Czech Refugees in US Zone, June 4, 1948, n/a.

On May 16, 1950, Czechoslovakia's representative to the United Nations, Vladimír Houdek, resigned from his post and applied for political asylum in the United States [16, p. 14]. Although US law prohibited the admission of communists, the Attorney General could consider exceptional cases. Houdek's predecessor, Jan Papánek, accused him of making the request only under threat of recall and arrest. Papánek himself had refused to recognize the communist regime and remained at his post until the end of his mandate in 1950, after which he stayed in the United States. While in exile, he founded the American Relief Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees and became involved with Amnesty International and CARE.

It is worth noting that during the first three years of communist rule in Czechoslovakia (March 1947 — March 1950), a total of 236,000 citizens fled to the West for political reasons. Among them were 35 members of parliament, 12 ambassadors and ministers, 12 consuls general, nearly one hundred lower-ranking diplomats, and 18 generals of the army and air force [3, p. 333].

The establishment of pro-Soviet regimes in other Eastern European countries was inevitably accompanied by the emergence of significant groups of political refugees. On October 17, 1947, anticipating imminent arrest, Polish Deputy Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk sought assistance from the US embassy. Three days later, he was secretly evacuated from Gdynia aboard the ship *Batavia* and eventually arrived in the United States via London [17, p. 819—820]. Polish scholar Marek Latynski suggested that Mikołajczyk's hasty departure may have been a deliberate provocation orchestrated by the communist authorities aimed at discrediting the politician. According to Latynski, the spread of a "cowardly" image hindered the former head of the London-based Polish government-in-exile from becoming a leading figure among Polish émigrés in the West [17, p. 861]. In contrast, Petar Vandić emphasized Mikołajczyk's efforts to establish an alternative émigré center in the United States, independent of the ones in London and Paris [4, p. 322—323].

Earlier, in 1945, American diplomats were involved in the evacuation of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union leader Georgi "Gemeto" Dimitrov from Bulgaria. On May 23, 1945, Dimitrov escaped from house arrest and took refuge at the villa of US diplomatic representative Maynard Barnes in Sofia, where he was surrounded by Soviet military personnel. After a three-month diplomatic standoff, on September 5, 1945, Dimitrov was allowed to leave for France. In 1947, while residing in the United States, he became head of the Bulgarian National Committee [18, p. 42].

During a foreign visit to Switzerland, Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy was effectively barred by Communist Party representatives from returning home and was forced to sign a letter of resignation [5, p. 329]. He soon received political asylum in the United States. Royalties from his memoirs, published in 1948 by McMillan, enabled him to purchase a residence in Herndon, Virginia [19, p. 294].

Hungarian Minister of Finance Miklós Nyáradi defected during a foreign visit in November 1948 and was later resettled in the United States [20, p. 169]. Following his defection, Nyáradi was interrogated for two days at the US embassy in Bern. The result was a 72-page report detailing the nature of economic relations between Moscow and

Budapest. In particular, the former official exposed Soviet methods of exerting control over Hungary's economy, using as an example the course of negotiations with the USSR from May to December 1947. Notably, Soviet General Vsevolod Merkulov demanded the establishment of joint enterprises financed by Hungarian resources [21, p. 23].

In December 1948, former Hungarian Minister of Defense Albert Bartha fled through the forests near Sopron into Austria. The United States did not immediately grant him political asylum, and the retired official spent some time living in Belgium and Venezuela. Minister of Industry Antal Bán migrated to Switzerland, while former Minister of Finance and Ambassador to Switzerland Ferenc Gordon departed for Argentina.

Romanian former Prime Minister Nicolae Rădescu managed to escape to the United States in June 1946 through the British Embassy. There, he gathered a circle of political émigrés. Following the Sovietization of Romania, he was sentenced in absentia to two years of forced labor during the show trial of the "National Resistance Movement." While in exile in 1949, he became the head of the Romanian National Committee (RNC). The following year, due to internal disagreements, he left the RNC and established the League of Free Romanians [6, p. 151], through which he awarded scholarships to young Romanian exiles.

One of the activists of the League of Free Romanians, Vintilă Brătianu, had already been sentenced in 1946 by the Romanian communist authorities on charges of high treason. The son of a former Romanian prime minister subsequently fled to the West and arrived in the United States in 1949. However, on March 23, 1950, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service arrested Brătianu, his wife, and two daughters for overstaying their visitor visas and initiated deportation procedures [22, p. 25]. American authorities responded to the situation with understanding and proceeded with the case very slowly. Republican Senator from Ohio, Robert Taft, introduced a bill to allow the political opponent to remain in the country.

In addition, former Romanian Foreign Minister Constantin Vișoianu relocated to the United States, where he became one of the leading figures of the Romanian émigré community and headed the Romanian National Committee. Minister of Culture Constantin Burducea fled through Yugoslavia to Italy, where, with American support, he was interned in a refugee camp before emigrating to Argentina [23, p. 218]. Romanian economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, aided by the Jewish community, fled Romania with forged documents, hiding in the hold of a ship to reach Turkey. From there, he traveled through France to the United States, where he began teaching economics at Harvard University and Vanderbilt University in Nashville [9, p. 133].

A key focus of the US Department of State was the financial support of émigré organizations created by "refugees from the Iron Curtain countries". One of the first to receive American state funding was the organization of Petr Zenkl — the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, founded on February 25, 1949, in Washington, D.C. The council included 174 exiled politicians, with Slovak representative Jozef Lettrich serving as vice-chairman [24, p. 272]. The Council unsuccessfully claimed the rights of a government-in-exile for Czechs and Slovaks and sent appeals to 39 countries. Additional support

was provided to the Hungarian National Council, established in Washington in 1947 by Monsignor Béla Varga, former speaker of the Hungarian parliament.

It is noteworthy that refugees seeking entry into the United States came from various walks of life, including prominent Romanian industrialist Nicolae Malaxa, owner of metallurgical and engineering plants; Nesti Kopali, head of the Rome-based station of the Albanian secret police Sigurimi; and Vladko Maček, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party. The methods of escape to the West were diverse. For instance, in March 1950, eight Czechoslovak pilots hijacked three airplanes and, along with 58 passengers, flew them to the American occupation zone in Germany. The United States refused to extradite them to the Prague regime for prosecution and granted them political asylum. In response, Czechoslovak diplomats accused the US of “employing Nazi Gestapo methods” [25, p. 1]. American diplomats countered that, under international law, they could not extradite individuals in the absence of a criminal offense.

One of the highest-profile episodes involving escapees from the Soviet Union was the so-called “Kosenkina affair.” Oksana Kosenkina, a chemistry teacher at a Soviet school in New York, became the center of a major diplomatic incident between the United States and the USSR. In July 1948, anticipating a forced recall to the Soviet Union, Kosenkina fled to a farm owned by the Tolstoy Foundation [26, p. 18]. However, five days later, she wrote a letter to the Soviet Consul General, Yakov Lomakin, who subsequently transported her to the Soviet embassy and held a widely publicized press conference. On August 12, 1948, Kosenkina escaped from the embassy by jumping out of a third-story window and thereafter remained in the United States [27, p. 84].

The Kosenkina affair triggered a diplomatic scandal. Accused of kidnapping, Consul Lomakin was declared *persona non grata*. In retaliation, the Soviet Union broke off negotiations concerning Berlin, shut down the US consulates in Leningrad and Vladivostok, and the United States responded by closing the Soviet consulates in New York and San Francisco. Consular relations between the two powers were not restored for another 24 years.

Not only regime opponents were forced to flee. In 1950, Ulrich Noack, a West German intellectual who advocated for compromise with the USSR and the neutrality of Germany, found himself under threat of arrest while in East Germany. A professor of history at the University of Würzburg, he had been invited to deliver a series of lectures at the Administrative Academy in Forst Zinna near Berlin. However, after his first lecture, he was accused of “inciting psychological warfare,” and the remainder of the lecture series was canceled. Noack claimed he had learned of communist plans to launch a military invasion of West Germany following orchestrated uprisings there [28, p. 4].

Among the escapees was also Wolfgang Leonhard, a prominent party ideologue of the East German regime. In March 1949, he fled East Germany through Czechoslovakia to Yugoslavia. A year later, he resettled in West Germany and was later invited to lecture at leading American universities, including Oxford, Columbia, and Yale.

Relations among the four occupying powers in Germany deteriorated sharply during the Berlin Crisis of 1948. In the final months of that year, on the eve of the So-

viet blockade, approximately 5,000 Jews and some anti-communists from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia fled to West Berlin [29, p. 5].

The fate of the escapees varied significantly. In the American-occupied zone of Austria, refugees received food and shelter from the US Army for ten days. In Vienna and Linz, a screening process was conducted: some refugees from behind the Iron Curtain were granted refugee status, while those discovered to have ties with Soviet intelligence services were deported back. Individuals without means of subsistence were sent to a transit center in Salzburg maintained by the Austrian government, where they were assigned vacancies for agricultural or construction work. Those who refused employment were transferred to DP camps, where they awaited assistance from volunteer agencies. Migration activity was seasonal. By the early 1950s, unlike in 1945–1946, Jewish migrants accounted for only 10 % of those fleeing⁴.

As of November 1, 1951, Austria hosted 211,000 ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) and 53,000 refugees from Iron Curtain countries, including 103,000 and 18,000 persons respectively in the American zone⁵. Assistance to these “new refugees” was provided jointly by military authorities, Austrian officials, and voluntary organizations. The primary solutions considered were employment in Austria or Germany, or enlistment in the US Army or NATO forces. Resettlement programs for “refugees from communism” were no longer on the table, as by the early 1950s, the United States had admitted approximately 400,000 displaced persons under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and its 1950 amendments, effectively fulfilling its legislated quotas. Australia’s International Refugee Organization (IRO)-sponsored migration program, launched in 1947, had also reached its planned intake of around 170,000 European migrants by 1951, prompting a gradual shift toward selective admission based on occupational needs, particularly in agriculture and heavy industry [30, p. 22]. Canada maintained a more flexible intake structure but retained ethnic and occupational preferences. Between 1947 and 1953, Canadian immigration authorities admitted roughly 186,000 displaced persons, with a marked preference for ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Baltic region, in part due to perceived cultural compatibility and rural labor shortages.

Several Latin American states — notably Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela — implemented targeted migration schemes in the late 1940s that likewise prioritized ethnic Germans and skilled technical workers. Argentina’s Perón government, for example, used refugee admissions both to boost industrial capacity and to signal an anti-communist stance, while simultaneously maintaining informal channels for politically vetted migrants from Eastern Europe. Brazil’s policy favored agricultural settlers of European origin, reflecting demographic engineering goals in sparsely populated rural areas.

⁴ Ibid. RG 59, S. IRO and DPC, I. DPC, B. 7, Letter from US Deputy Commissioner for Austria Coburn Kidd to DOS concerning treatment of Iron Curtain Refugees in Austria, October 19, 1951, n/a.

⁵ Ibid. B. 1, Letter from Deputy High Commissioner Walter Dowling to DOS concerning Refugee situation in Austria, December 27, 1951, June 2, 1950, p. 6.

These patterns reveal a common feature: while the United States and its allies publicly upheld the humanitarian principle of asylum, actual admission policies were shaped by a combination of domestic economic needs, demographic planning, and the geopolitical calculus of the early Cold War.

In total, after the rise of the pro-communist regime in Hungary, about 10,000 people fled the country; 50,000 left Czechoslovakia; nearly one million Poles and 400,000 Finns were displaced from territories that were annexed by the Soviet Union. Additionally, between 1949 and 1952, approximately 200,000 ethnic Turks were expelled by Bulgaria's communist regime [1, p. 214].

The phenomenon of mass emigration from Eastern Bloc countries became known in journalism and historiography as *Republikflucht* ("Flight from the Republic"). In 1949 alone, 129,000 individuals from Eastern Europe applied for political asylum in West Germany. The following year, in 1950, the number of *Republikflüchtlinge* reached 197,000; in 1951, 165,000; and in 1952, 182,000 [31, p. 260]. The threat of mass migration forced East Germany's leadership in 1952 to seal the inner-German border with the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, despite these measures, the number of escapees continued to grow. As a result, on June 30, 1952, the West German government began construction of the large reception camp Marienfelde, intended for the temporary housing of refugees from the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

The decision to construct the Marienfelde reception camp was part of a broader West German strategy to manage the influx of "new refugees" from the GDR and other Eastern Bloc states. West Berlin, as an exclave within East German territory, served as a principal transit point for escapees before the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The camp was designed not only as a humanitarian facility but also as an instrument of political messaging, demonstrating the Federal Republic's willingness to provide shelter and support for those rejecting communist regimes. Coordination with the United States was implicit, as American authorities provided financial assistance and logistical expertise, particularly in the camp's initial screening and documentation processes. The facility's primary residents were East German citizens — including political dissidents, professionals, and families — but it also housed escapees from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary who had reached West Berlin through various routes⁶.

In contrast, by the early 1950s, the Czechoslovak authorities had successfully curbed the flow of refugees. The peak figure of nearly a quarter of a million escapees

⁶ Between 1953 and 1990, Marienfelde processed approximately 1.35 million individuals, most of whom were granted expedited residency and integration support in the Federal Republic. The camp's procedures included political debriefings, health checks, vocational placement, and orientation programs aimed at rapid assimilation into West German society. Following German reunification in 1990, the Marienfelde facility was formally closed as a reception center. Part of the site was converted into the Marienfelde Refugee Center Museum, which documents the history of escape and migration during the Cold War. In the mid-2010s, amid the European migrant crisis, sections of the former camp were temporarily repurposed to accommodate refugees from Syria and other conflict zones, underscoring the continued relevance of its legacy in German and European refugee policy.

between 1947 and 1950 was not reached again over the next four decades. As part of Operation “Kámen” (“Stone”), the Czechoslovak secret police implemented a series of countermeasures. In 1950, following the defection of Stanislav Liška, commander of the State Security (ŠtB) post in Všeruby, American officials learned of the operation [3, p. 341]. During his interrogation at the refugee camp in Ludwigsburg, the former security officer revealed that the Prague regime had effectively sealed its borders through agent infiltration and the use of decoy guides.

It is also important to note that Eastern Bloc intelligence services attempted to exploit Cold War refugees for their own ends. US intelligence reported that the German Communist Party was seeking to “gain political capital” by conducting propaganda among German expellees. In February 1948, agents discovered that party members in Hesse had received instructions to undermine centrist parties and promote radicalization and polarization among the refugee population⁷. In 1950, intelligence sources uncovered Soviet plans to exploit the issue of political refugees to destabilize the Federal Republic. On September 29, 1950, German police launched a series of preventive actions to avert anticipated worker unrest in the Ruhr region [32, p. 7]. Hamburg and Cologne were identified as the likely centers of agitation. During that month, the influx of “refugees from the East” doubled, reaching 1,000 persons per day. Numerous Soviet agents, disguised as political refugees, attempted to infiltrate Cologne, the hometown of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Consequently, local authorities temporarily banned mass gatherings and increased the presence of police forces.

When evidence emerged of the Soviet secret services exploiting political refugees for their own purposes in North America, scandals erupted—among the most notorious was the “Leshchenko case.” On April 23, 1949, Canadian authorities announced the arrest of Dmytro Leshchenko, who had entered the country under false documents as a Latvian displaced person named Dymitro Laksdo and was working on the railways. The operation led to the uncovering of a spy network of twenty individuals operating in both Canada and the United States. Thanks to the exposure, nine individuals suspected of espionage on behalf of the USSR were arrested in New York [33, p. 3].

Since the USSR and its satellite states did not join the International Refugee Organization, the United States made efforts to extend IRO’s protection and assistance to refugees from communist regimes. At an IRO meeting on May 29, 1950, it was estimated that 10,000 refugees had fled from communist Eastern Europe in the previous seven months [34, p. 1]. In the summer of 1949, the IRO decided that new refugees who had arrived in Germany, Austria, or Italy after October 15, 1949, would be granted legal protection but would not be eligible for material assistance, access to refugee camps, or participation in the organization’s overseas transportation programs.

As the issue of expanding the IRO’s jurisdiction was regularly raised, Director-General J. Donald Kingsley planned to discuss the matter of “refugees from commu-

⁷ NARA NACP, Maryland. RG 59, S. IRO and DPC, I. DPC, B. 8, Letter from the political officer G. Offie to the Honorable the Secretary of State concerning KPD activities in Hesse among Refugees, March 30, 1948, n/a.

nism” with the US Department of State. At the IRO Executive Committee meeting on January 28, 1949, discussions included proposals to extend the organization’s mandate to cover Albanian and satellite–state refugees in Greece, Italian-origin migrants from Venezia Giulia and Istria, as well as those in the American-British zone of Trieste⁸.

Turkey was the first country to seek international support for its role in assisting political refugees. Turkish authorities provided asylum to individuals fleeing Balkan countries — mainly diplomats and military personnel who had become stateless after refusing to serve the newly established communist governments in Eastern Europe⁹. In cases where the escapees did not participate in American or Australian resettlement programs for displaced persons, Latin American embassies increased their involvement: Argentina issued visas to Romanians and Hungarians, while Brazil assisted Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks, and Iranians. In consultations with Kingsley, US diplomats encouraged Turkish accession to the IRO to better address the refugee situation. However, the United States did not consider Balkan refugees in Turkey to be a valuable or priority source of intelligence.

Greece became the second country involved in this process. American diplomats encouraged Greek officials to adopt Turkey’s “open-door” policy toward political refugees from the Eastern Bloc. Specifically, the US State Department recommended that Greece follow Turkey’s example, which had officially declared its readiness to accept Bulgarian political refugees. In the autumn of 1947, eight deputies from the opposition Agrarian Party managed to flee across the Turkish border [35, p. 321]. Later, the Greek General Staff was advised to pursue a similar approach by Karl Rankin, the American embassy counselor in Athens. The Greek government expressed willingness to begin accepting refugees, provided that adequate funding was secured and security concerns were addressed¹⁰. Previously, Greek authorities had agreed only to serve as a transit country and not a host for large groups of refugees, especially given that 700,000 Greeks had become internally displaced persons as a result of the country’s civil war.

On July 13, 1948, US Ambassador to France Jefferson Caffery reported an appeal from the International Rescue and Relief Committee concerning the fate of 1,200 refugees from Yugoslavia, Romania, and Albania residing in the Greek camp at Lavrion. These escapees from communist tyranny complained about the appalling living conditions and the “senseless deaths” of fellow inmates. Between September 1946 and April 1947, twenty refugees reportedly died while performing hard labor under the supervision of Greek communists¹¹. Additionally, the refugees from the Eastern Bloc requested an inspection by the International Refugee Organization.

⁸ Ibid. RG 59, S. IRO and DPC, I. IRO, B. 8, Incoming telegram from US Consul in Geneva, Mr. Troutman, to the Secretary of State, January 30, 1949, n/a.

⁹ Ibid. M 1284, R. 70, Letter from US Consul General in Istanbul John J. MacDonald to US Department of State concerning Balkan Refugees in Istanbul, April 19, 1949, img. 50—53.

¹⁰ Ibid. RG 59, S. IRO and DPC, I. IRO, B. 8, Letter from Counselor of US embassy in Athens Karl Lott Rankin to the Secretary of State, July 13, 1948, n/a.

¹¹ Ibid. Letter from US Ambassador to Paris Jefferson Caffery to the Secretary of State, July 13, 1948, n/a.

In December 1948, a meeting was held by the IRO to address the issue of refugees from communist countries residing in Greece¹². Attendees included IRO Director-General William H. Tuck, Chief of the IRO's Washington Office General Walter Wood, George Warren, and Leonard Cromie (the US State Department's officer responsible for Greek, Turkish, and Iranian affairs). At that time, Greece hosted 3,000 Greek-speaking refugees from Albania, 600 Albanians, 300 individuals from Yugoslavia, 300 from Bulgaria, and 30 from Romania. Following a formal request from Greek authorities, the IRO's Rome branch agreed to assume responsibility for their care. The Greek government was preparing documentation to seek compensation for expenses incurred from the IRO.

George Warren expressed reservations about this approach, questioning the administrative capacity of the Greek side and recommending that internally displaced persons — Greek citizens displaced by the civil war — be included in the list of those eligible for IRO assistance to incentivize Greek cooperation. In turn, Leonard Cromie emphasized that a key political priority for the Greek authorities should be to conduct their own refugee screening procedures to detect potential communist agents. At the same time, the establishment of adequate living conditions for the escapees was viewed as a matter of the country's international prestige.

The issue of Eastern European refugees also remained relevant in Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste. In October 1949, Charles Baldwin, the US political advisor in Trieste, proposed categorizing migrants into three groups. The first group included those who had arrived from Istria after December 1947 (between 15,000 and 30,000 individuals), most of whom qualified for Italian citizenship. For those who did not meet the criteria, American diplomats, following recommendations from the Zone A Planning Section and the Welfare Department of the Allied Military Government, advised in June 1949 that they seek assistance from the IRO and the Italian government. US officials unsuccessfully encouraged Italian authorities to develop a postwar aid program for former residents of Italy's lost territories. As a result, on September 16, 1949, the Zone A Allied Command Council decided to assume moral responsibility for the remaining refugees in Trieste, designating them as "Istrian refugees."

The second group consisted of political refugees from Eastern Europe (3,200 individuals). The US State Department anticipated a continued influx of such refugees and advised their temporary support by the IRO. After the organization's mandate ended, the expectation was for support to shift to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).

The third group comprised persons arriving from Yugoslavia's Zone B (both Yugoslavs and Italians). In this case, US officials expected an increase in the number of refugees from Yugoslavia should President Josip Broz Tito be removed from power¹³.

¹² Ibid. M 1284, R. 70, Memorandum of Conversation concerning IRO plans regarding care of Refugees in Greece, December 31, 1948, img. 1—2.

¹³ Ibid. RG 59, S. IRO and DPC, I. DPC, B. 11, Letter from US Political Adviser in Trieste Charles F. Baldwin to DOS concerning The Refugee problem in the British / United States Zone in Free Territory of Trieste, October 28, 1949, p. 1—10.

In a telegram dated February 16, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson emphasized that refugees from Eastern Bloc countries in Trieste should be accepted. His reasoning extended beyond humanitarian considerations to include their potential as valuable sources of information about life behind the Iron Curtain. Acheson did not see the transfer of refugees to Germany or the extension of IRO jurisdiction as viable solutions. Instead, he considered the best course of action to be the transfer of responsibility for the refugees to the Italian authorities. He further expressed hope for the Italians' lenient treatment of migrants crossing from Yugoslavia. To address the issue of the "new refugees," Acheson advised the US political advisor to gain the support of the British military governor of the Anglo-American zone of Trieste, General Terence Airey¹⁴.

Two potential solutions to the influx of Central and Eastern European refugees into the Anglo-American zone of the Free Territory of Trieste were proposed in a memorandum by General Clyde Eddleman. He suggested that the Allies should either accept all refugees or none at all. In August 1950, US Political Advisor in Trieste Leonard Unger reported to Washington on the main groups of refugees. On one hand, there were voluntary émigrés from the Eastern Bloc (Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians); on the other, there were forced deportees, such as White émigrés expelled by the Yugoslav government¹⁵.

As of September 30, 1950, the Allied Military Government's refugee center in Trieste hosted 2,790 individuals. Among them, 955 were stateless Russians, 292 were citizens of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 226 were from Hungary, 184 were from Bulgaria, and 102 were from Romania¹⁶.

The issue of "Iron Curtain refugees" was addressed in a July 1951 report prepared for the US National Security Council by Gordon First and George Warren. Future American actions to address the problem of European exiles, the authors argued, should focus on maximizing the use of IRO mechanisms and providing both moral and material support to refugees from communism¹⁷. In November 1951, the new US political advisor in Trieste, Donald Downs, reported growing despair among the refugees — many of whom, shortly after fleeing to the West, sought to return home. Downs described this phenomenon as the "first-month disillusionment": while escapees had expected to contribute actively to the anti-communist cause, they soon realized that their services were not in demand.

For example, amid rumors of a Romanian royal army being formed in Australia, Romanian defectors inquired about volunteering for military service in Korea. While support from voluntary agencies was limited, the Bulgarian National Committee re-

¹⁴ Ibid. RG 59, S. IRO and DPC, I. DPC, B. 11, Outgoing telegram from the Secretary of State D. Acheson to US Political Advisor in Trieste, February 16, 1950, n/a.

¹⁵ Ibid. B. 11, Letter from US Political Adviser in Trieste Leonard Unger to DOS concerning Eastern European Refugee Problem, August 8, 1950, n/a.

¹⁶ Ibid. Letter from US Political Adviser in Trieste Leonard Unger to DOS concerning Movement of Eastern European Refugees into British / United States Zone in Free Territory of Trieste during September 1950, October 23, 1950, n/a.

¹⁷ Ibid. RG 59, S. IRO and DPC, I. IRO, B. 1, Draft NSC Paper concerning IRO, July 21, 1951, n/a.

mained relatively active, with some financial assistance provided by the World Council of Churches. However, these efforts were largely undermined by poor living conditions in the Allied military camps and the absence of any legal or material support frameworks. This group of refugees fell outside the temporal and geographic criteria for both the US Displaced Persons Program and the IRO mandate. Among the reasons cited for return were the realization that Western Allies would neither liberate their homelands from communism nor provide them with career opportunities in the new world. Within a year, twenty Hungarian and three Bulgarian refugees accepted amnesty, and some Yugoslav refugees agreed to voluntary repatriation¹⁸.

Soviet propaganda placed considerable emphasis on fostering depressive sentiments among refugees and displaced persons. It actively exploited nostalgic emotions and disseminated narratives about the supposed improvements in living conditions in the USSR and the Eastern Bloc. Stalinist propagandists frequently accused Western occupation authorities of forcibly detaining Soviet citizens. For instance, an article published in *Vechernyaya Moskva* on September 8, 1949, likened displaced persons camps to slave markets, where foreign corporations allegedly scouted for manual laborers. The article claimed that “victims of capitalist exploitation” were being recruited solely for unskilled and physically demanding labor¹⁹.

Another key outlet for Soviet propaganda was *The New Times*, a multilingual magazine supplement to the newspaper *Trud*, published in four foreign languages. In its pages, the Kremlin “troubadours” asserted that the International Refugee Organization had failed to fulfill its mandate and had effectively become a “slave market and a center for recruiting spies and organizing subversive activity” [36, p. 10]. Additional accusations were leveled against the IRO, claiming that it had joined other institutions such as the International Labour Organization, UNESCO, and World Health Organization in becoming an instrument of the “Anglo-American bloc” in its struggle against the “people’s democracies.” Particular criticism was directed at the IRO’s Austrian mission, whose staff Soviet propagandists accused of “selling cheap labor” instead of repatriating “former victims of fascist enslavement.” A notable shift in rhetoric could be observed: whereas earlier Soviet journalists had accused the IRO of “harboring criminals” in DP camps, they now framed the issue as one of “kidnapping Soviet citizens” and “tearing them apart from their families” [37]²⁰. In response, US High Commissioner for Germany John J. McCloy called on the State Department to counter Soviet attempts to discredit the IRO.

By the late 1940s, the Soviet propaganda apparatus had adopted an increasingly aggressive posture. On December 1, 1948, the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published a poem by Sergei Mikhalkov, author of the Soviet national anthem’s lyrics, entitled “We Accuse!” [38, p. 9]. The following year, Mikhalkov penned a play titled *I Want to Go Home!*, which won the Stalin Prize (Second Class) in 1950. The play was adapted into a film directed

¹⁸ Ibid. Letter from Acting US Political Adviser in Trieste, Donald P. Downs, to DOS concerning some reasons why Soviet Orbit Refugees are disappointed in the West, November 7, 1951, n/a.

¹⁹ Ibid. RG 59, S. IRO and DPC, I. IRO, B. 9, Telegram from US Ambassador to Moscow Alan G. Kirk to the Secretary of State, September 21, 1949, n/a.

²⁰ Ibid. Telegram from J. McCloy to the Secretary of State, June 20, 1950, n/a.

by Aleksandr Faintsimmer and Vladimir Legoshin at the Gorky Film Studio in Moscow. The resulting drama, *They Have a Motherland*, received high praise from Party leadership. In the film, Soviet agents locate an orphanage in Western Germany and return “forcibly held children” to their homeland. The film was awarded the Stalin Prize (Third Class) in 1950.

The Soviet Union also sought to promote its propaganda through international forums, including the United Nations. At a session of the UN Social Committee on November 11, 1949, in Lake Success, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Aleksandr Panyushkin accused the West of recruiting displaced persons as spies in communist countries [39, p. 7]. He also repeated traditional allegations of using DPs as cheap labor and subjecting them to physical coercion to prevent their return to the USSR. US representative, J. Donald Kingsley rejected these claims, noting that during eighteen months of IRO operations, more than half of the 66,000 repatriated individuals had returned to Poland, not the Soviet Union. Earlier, on October 15, 1949, at another session of the UN Social Committee, Panyushkin had accused Britain and the United States of “continuing Hitler’s slave policy.” This propagandistic trope was applied to the alleged “forced” presence of half a million Soviet citizens in DP camps [40, p. 2].

On February 2, 1952, the United Nations General Assembly rejected a Soviet-led initiative calling for the forced repatriation of Iron Curtain refugees. The vote tally stood at five in favor, thirty-four against, and fifteen abstentions. Soviet delegate Aleksei Pavlov accused the United States of forcibly detaining 20,000 individuals in Western Germany with the alleged support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The failed resolution also charged the United States with allegedly “recruiting former White Army officers into anti-Soviet armed formations.”

In addition, the Soviet side exploited the mechanisms of the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) to propagate ideological myths and level accusations against the United States and other Western countries of “kidnapping children” and “forcibly separating families.” On April 8, 1949, during a session of the Executive Committee of the LRCS held in Geneva, a resolution was adopted at the behest of the Soviet delegation regarding the repatriation of Soviet children²¹. National Red Cross societies in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, alongside local governments, were called upon to facilitate the return of Soviet children under humanitarian pretexts, ostensibly to “reunite families.”

In a subsequent appeal issued during a joint session of the Executive Committee of the LRCS and the Soviet Red Cross Association held in Geneva from October 12 to 14, 1949, the US State Department was urged to begin the immediate repatriation of Soviet children located in the American zones of Germany and Austria²². In May 1951, through the LRCS, a request was submitted to the administration of the British

²¹ Ibid. RG 59, M 1284, R. 70, Letter from Secretary General of League of Red Cross Societies Federation of the National Red Cross Societies in Geneva B. de Rouge to the President of American National Red Cross Basil O’Connor concerning repatriation of Soviet children, April 26, 1949, img. 100—101.

²² Ibid. RG 59, M 1284, R. 70, Letter Executive vice-president of the American National Red Cross to the Honorable the Secretary of State Dean C. Acheson concerning repatriation of Soviet children, April 26, 1949, img. 139.

occupation zone seeking permission for a Soviet delegation to locate and retrieve unaccompanied minors of Soviet origin. The British responded that they would consider such a delegation once the Soviet Union allowed a reciprocal mission to locate German children within its territory. The Soviet side failed to respond to this offer²³.

Soviet satellite states also employed the Red Cross platform for propaganda purposes. On October 20, 1950, during a congress in Monte Carlo, Czechoslovak delegate Dr. Jozef Skwaril accused the United States of conducting psychological warfare by preparing refugees for “revenge” that was allegedly imminent. He described West Germany as a “capitalist staging ground for a new war” [41, p. 9]. American delegate James Nicholson declined to engage with the accusations and instead called for a return to the forum’s original humanitarian mandate. It is worth noting that the US consistently rejected Soviet allegations, stressing the voluntary nature of repatriation and highlighting the unprecedented scale of successful postwar repatriation efforts.

From 1944 to 1952, the United States progressively transformed its approach to refugees from Central and Eastern Europe, adapting it to the geopolitical realities of the early Cold War. Initially grounded in the multilateral humanitarianism of the late Roosevelt period, the policy evolved under Truman into a more targeted strategy in which refugee issues were integrated with foreign policy, security considerations, and ideological competition with the Soviet bloc.

By distinguishing between political refugees and displaced persons, US authorities crafted flexible legal approaches to avoid forced repatriation, using them to protect individuals at risk while also identifying those whose skills, political experience, or symbolic significance could serve Western interests. The endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 reinforced the moral and legal legitimacy of these actions, particularly through its recognition of the right to seek asylum.

The United States worked closely with international organizations, allied governments, and émigré communities to implement resettlement programs that met both humanitarian obligations and strategic needs. While aligned with broader Western efforts, Washington’s approach reflected distinct priorities, balancing moral responsibility with the practicalities of Cold War statecraft. Examples such as the Marienfelde reception center in West Germany illustrated the dual humanitarian and political dimensions of refugee assistance.

Soviet and satellite responses — including propaganda campaigns, diplomatic efforts, and infiltration of exile groups — underscored the contested nature of the refugee issue. High-profile cases could shift from individual tragedies to matters of international consequence, influencing public opinion and diplomatic relations.

Ultimately, US refugee policy in this period demonstrated how humanitarian protection and geopolitical strategy could be interwoven. By safeguarding those fleeing communist regimes while channeling their cause into a wider campaign to delegitimize Soviet influence, the United States turned the refugee question into an enduring instrument of influence in the emerging bipolar world order.

²³ Ibid. S. IRO and DPC, I. DPC, B. 7, Letter from the Chief of Displaced Populations Division at HICOG Guy J. Swope to DOS concerning children of alleged Soviet nationality in the British Zone, May 27, 1952, n/a.

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БІЖЕНЦІ ВІД КОМУНІЗМУ: ПОЛІТИКА США ЩОДО ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ ЕМІГРАЦІЇ З ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЇ ТА СХІДНОЇ ЄВРОПИ В УМОВАХ РАДЯНІЗАЦІЇ (1944—1952 рр.)

Мета — виявлення особливостей формування та реалізації політики США щодо політичної еміграції з країн Центральної та Східної Європи впродовж 1944—1952 рр. у контексті радянської регіону та ескалації «холодної війни». У центрі уваги аналіз механізмів прийому, правового статусу, політичної обробки, символічного використання біженців від комунізму, котрі покидали новостворені соціалістичні держави. Розглянуто як стратегічні підходи Вашингтона до проблеми політичної еміграції, так й окремі епізоди втечі урядов-

ців, дипломатів, військовиків, інтелектуалів із Чехословаччини, Польщі, Угорщини, Румунії, Югославії та ін. Акцентовано на взаємодії американської адміністрації з емігрантськими комітетами, діяльності Міжнародної організації у справах біженців та дипломатичному конфлікті навколо репатріації. **Методологія.** Застосовано комплекс загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, порівняння, діалектичний) і спеціальних (історико-генетичний, історико-порівняльний, історико-типологічний, проблемно-хронологічний) методів історичного пізнання. Основним аналітичним інструментом виступає проблемно-хронологічний метод, що дає змогу простежити еволюцію політики США щодо біженців у визначених хронологічних межах і встановити кореляцію між політичними процесами у країнах Східного блоку й інституційними та дипломатичними реакціями у Вашингтоні. Історико-порівняльний метод використано як допоміжний — для виявлення відмінностей у національних підходах США та їхніх союзників. **Наукова новизна** полягає в комплексному аналізі ролі Сполучених Штатів у розв'язанні проблеми політичної еміграції з Центральної і Східної Європи як важливої складової американської стратегії протидії радянському впливу на континенті. Вперше в українській історіографії узагальнено політичні, безпекові й гуманітарні аспекти цієї політики з опорою на широке коло архівних джерел. **Висновки.** У 1944—1952 рр. підхід США до біженців із країн комуністичного блоку Центральної та Східної Європи поєднував надання гуманітарної допомоги зі стратегічним розрахунком. Первісно сформована в межах багатосторонніх повоєнних програм підтримки, ця політика поступово набувала рис інструмента геополітичного протистояння, інтегруючи питання захисту біженців у ширший комплекс політичних, інформаційних, дипломатичних заходів. Ухвалення 1948 р. Загальної декларації прав людини надало додаткових правових і моральних підстав для відмови від примусової репатріації, тоді як вибіркові програми переселення орієнтувалися на осіб, чий політичний, професійний або символічний потенціал міг зміцнити позиції Заходу. Такий подвійний підхід утвердив Сполучені Штати як одного з провідних захисників тих, хто рятувався від тоталітарних режимів, і водночас як активного суб'єкта ідеологічного протиборства, яке визначало параметри формування повоєнного міжнародного порядку.

Ключові слова: США, політична еміграція, біженці від комунізму, переміщені особи, «холодна війна», Міжнародна організація у справах біженців, Центральна та Східна Європа, дипломатія.